A Short Meditation on Some Remaining Issues in Evidence Law by Burns, Robert P.
BURNS (FINAL) 12/1/2008 11:44:06 AM 
 
1435 
 
A Short Meditation on Some 
Remaining Issues in Evidence Law 
Robert P. Burns∗
I was pleased when Professor D. Michael Risinger invited me to 
offer some short comments on the Articles published in the last issue 
and more pleased yet when I read the fine essays.  They address with 
rare penetration some of the key issues in the American Law of Evi-
dence.  These remarks serve mainly to underscore the centrality of 
the topics addressed and raise a number of additional questions. 
Professor Risinger’s programmatic introduction to the issue re-
fers to his attempt to focus “the inquiry on some . . . broader ques-
tions of enduring mystery.”1  The latter term rarely occurs in discus-
sions among the hard-headed logicians who often engage in 
discussions of the law of evidence, but I think it is apt.  Specific issues 
in evidence law necessarily arise against a background of issues that 
do pose mysteries to be lived through, not merely problems to be 
solved.  The nature of human judgment in practical matters, even 
when competent, is “mysterious.”2  Evidence law inevitably reflects a 
practical resolution of tensions created by incommensurable values. 
Its structure both reflects and creates the political and legal culture, 
the “forms of life,” that are partially beyond scientific grasp.3  It as-
signs authority to judges or juries based on the elusive, if not mysteri-
ous, distinction between fact and law.  Its structure necessarily, 
though implicitly, takes a stand on the constitutional status of the ju-
ry4 and the range of jury authority over the norms for trial decision-
making, the extent to which the jury remains “judges of the law” in 
the interstices of legal rules.  Because it is law, its generality is always 
 ∗ Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law. 
 1 D. Michael Risinger, Guilt v. Guiltiness: Are the Right Rules for Trying Factual Inno-
cence Inevitably the Wrong Rules for Trying Culpability, 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 885, 886 
(2008) (emphasis added). 
 2 PETER STEINBERGER, THE CONCEPT OF POLITICAL JUDGMENT 222 (1993). 
 3 See HANNA PITKIN, WITTGENSTEIN AND JUSTICE 316–25 (1972). 
 4 AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 83, 96 
(1998) (on the absolute centrality of the jury to the vision animating all of the Bill of 
Rights). 
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in tension with the trial forum, the place where the “booming, buzz-
ing confusion” of the world of particulars talks back to the “law of 
rules.”  Its generality serves a first principle of procedural justice—
that similar cases be similarly decided—but always threatens to ex-
clude the details that show the uniqueness, the dissimilarity, of the 
case being tried.  And, as several of our authors point out, the doc-
trinal structure of exclusionary rules may be in tension with the inevi-
tably narrative structure of any understanding of human acts.  Any at-
tempt to mitigate evidence law’s generality by providing the judge 
discretion and insulating him or her from effective appellate review, 
as we do, invites all the arbitrariness that any “law of rules,”—
including procedural law of rules, such as evidence law—is designed 
to protect against.  By limiting the evidence that a party may present 
at trial, evidence law always threatens that other first principle of pro-
cedural justice: audiatur et altera pars (let the other side be heard).5
This all does not mean that there cannot be better or worse reso-
lutions to particular doctrinal questions that arise within evidence 
law, or that some of those questions are relatively detached from these 
deeper and more “mysterious” background issues.  But it does suggest 
that much more is afoot than a purely technical or logical discussion 
may evoke.  These issues are always in the background and involve is-
sues that are “essentially contested,” incapable of anything other than 
provisional resolution. 
Professor Risinger asks the important question of whether dif-
ferent sorts of evidence are appropriate for resolving the very differ-
ent sorts of questions that we ask jurors to resolve at trial, from ques-
tions of “brutally elementary facts,” such as the identity of a 
perpetrator of a crime, to much more interpretive and evaluative 
questions, such as issues surrounding states of mind and the “reason-
ableness” of past action.6  He then wonders whether the law of evi-
dence should accommodate this range of issues or whether “by the 
time the trial starts [it is] already too late, given the potential for the 
distortion of information that is inevitably a part of a system run 
largely by partisan adversaries[.]”7  He then offers a series of tentative 
conclusions about a series of interrelated issues.  For my part, I be-
lieve that the serious limitations of the adversary criminal trial on 
 5 STUART HAMPSHIRE, JUSTICE IS CONFLICT 9–17 (2001).  Hampshire quotes the 
adage in the imperative mood, audi alteram partem.  Id. at 11.  Several of the authors 
discussed in this essay find this principle embedded at an elevated level for criminal 
defendants in the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. 
 6 I provided a taxonomy of those issues in ROBERT P. BURNS, A THEORY OF THE 
TRIAL 185–201 (1999). 
 7 Risinger, supra note 1, at 888. 
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matters of “brutally elementary fact,” such as the identity of the per-
petrator of a violent crime, are in fact the results of serious problems 
of the market and bureaucratic systems within which the trial is em-
bedded.  Maldistribution of legal resources, police misconduct, or in-
adequate investigatory methods may skew results.  Thus, further re-
forms in the law of evidence, except further liberalization of rules 
controlling lay witness testimony, have a very limited role to play in 
improving the accuracy of trial decision-making.  I have come to the 
same conclusions as Professor Risinger on almost all the specific 
points he enumerated.  Except with regard to expert testimony, I am, 
as Professor Eleanor Swift recognizes,8 a strong proponent of the 
trend toward admissibility that we have seen for the last forty years 
and certainly an opponent of engrafting generalized refinements on 
existing rules.  Thus, I would not share Professor Risinger’s suspicion 
of free proof, if he means that suspicion to be general.  Because the 
applications of exclusionary rules are invariably categorical and al-
ways rob the jury of all the probative value that the excluded evidence 
has, I would invoke them only if we are convinced that the powerful 
critical devices of the adversary trial are inadequate to appropriately 
weigh the evidence.   
It seems to me that, as Professor Keith A. Findley suggested9, this 
may be true more for categories of evidence than for categories of is-
sues.  And the invocation of exclusionary rules should be made with a 
respect for the constitutional status of the jury so that determinations 
of materiality in particular should be quite liberal.  The important 
points that Professor Swift makes about the centrality of narrative 
structure to the trial10 provides additional arguments in favor of a lib-
eralized law of evidence: a single additional detail, and certainly a 
constellation of additional details, can substantially change the sig-
nificance of the stories told at trial.  And exclusion of all evidence on 
a question that the jury “naturally” asks does not take the question off 
the table.  It simply invites the jury to “finish the story” based on its 
own, often groundless, speculation.11  And so I would take Professor 
Risinger’s suspicion of “transcontextuality” of evidence rules to its 
logical conclusion: a suspicion of an additional set of intermediate 
rules that generally identify context.  Better that there be as few ex-
 8 Eleanor Swift, Narrative Theory, FRE 803(3), and Criminal Defendants’ Post-Crime 
State of Mind Hearsay, 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 975, 989, 1004 (2008). 
 9 Keith A. Findley, Innocents at Risk: Adversary Imbalance, Forensic Science, and the 
Search for Truth, 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 893 (2008). 
 10 Swift, supra note 8. 
 11 Shari Seidman Diamond & Neil Vidmar, Jury Room Ruminations on Forbidden 
Topics, 87 VA. L. REV. 1857 (2001). 
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clusionary rules as possible.  The only other alternative is to invest 
even more discretion in the trial judge to identify context in a man-
ner effectively unbound by rules.  And that raises the background is-
sues about both the role of the jury and the constitutionally based 
right of defendants to present their defenses. 
Finally, putting aside the special case of scientific evidence, I am 
not sure whether we can effectively separate the normative issues 
from the issues of brutally elementary fact in large range of cases.  It 
is true that in some criminal cases the central issue is identity; but 
even here there are often issues of the credibility of witnesses, the 
plausibility of alternative defense factual theories, and the reliability 
of confessions that must be evaluated contextually through the con-
struction and evaluation of narratives.  The great strength of the trial 
is its insistence on the importance of the most specific factual details 
to these contextual judgments.  Otherwise, the case is likely to be de-
cided on over-generalized stereotypes.  That is why even I would re-
tain the requirement that testimony be in the language of percep-
tion, wherever possible, and with full foundation as to personal 
knowledge.  Conversely, much of the evidence presented at trial is 
likely to have “two faces,” as trial lawyers like to say.  Even the deter-
mination of what that evidence is, not to say what it means, is inevita-
bly bound up in circular forms of reasoning where the whole (the 
more plausible narrative) determines the part (the nature and mean-
ing of particular perceptual judgments) and the parts the whole.12  So 
factual accuracy is crucial for deft normative judgments.  But deft 
normative judgments—about credibility and the reliability of confes-
sions, for example—may be crucial for determinations of brutally 
elementary fact.  Yes, there is a continuum, but I am not sure whether 
we can identify rules that say when we should apply a different set of 
rules. 
Professor Findley’s fine Article identifies the investigative, doc-
trinal, and evidentiary realities that disadvantage defendants, espe-
cially fully innocent defendants, and, he argues persuasively, often 
overwhelm the “advantages” that come from the privilege against self-
incrimination and the stated burden of proof.13  I will not try to sum-
marize his argument.  There is one important question that his Arti-
cle raises.  It echoes Professor Risinger’s concern about the practical 
possibility of reform.14  It is clear that the formal qualities of the 
 12 Robert P. Burns, The Distinctiveness of Trial Narrative, in 1 THE TRIAL ON TRIAL: 
TRUTH AND DUE PROCESS, 157, 167–69 (Antony Duff et al. eds., 2000). 
 13 Findley, supra note 9. 
 14 Risinger, supra note 1, at 888. 
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criminal trial, including the terms of the law of evidence, play only a 
part in the criminal justice “system.”  The operation of markets and 
bureaucracies, which function on principles quite remote from those 
that structure the trial’s “due process” model15 are, as Professor 
Findley demonstrates in a range of contexts, even more important in 
establishing the form of criminal justice we concretely have.  The fear 
is that whatever reforms we may be able to achieve in the trial’s for-
mal structure will quickly be counterbalanced by adjustments in the 
systems world within which that structure occurs.16  Taken to an ex-
treme, such a deterministic perspective, which envisions a kind of 
cast-iron equilibrium, would paralyze any attempt at reform. 
But assume for a moment, as I think we have to, both that there is 
some mutual causality between formal structures and the systems 
within which they are embedded, and that we have (at least ab-
stractly) some ability actually to shape that balance in our “spaces of 
freedom,” such as legislatures and appellate courts.17  Where and how 
could a discussion take place where there might be a rational rebal-
ancing of formal rules and the behaviors of markets and bureaucra-
cies?  Effective law enforcement is an important goal; it is supported 
by powerful bureaucratic incentives to “clear cases” and political in-
centives to gain convictions, and is passionately embraced by many 
police officers and prosecutors who see first-hand the effects of vio-
lent crime.  Writers sympathetic to the importance of truth at trial 
tend to attribute excesses of partisanship on the part of police and 
prosecution to the perceived excess of partisanship by defense coun-
sel and the perceived overreaching of legal formalisms, including the 
rules of evidence and constitutional principles of criminal procedure 
that sacrifice accuracy in order to control the police.18  Prosecutors 
and defense counsel tend to be partisans even in the political discus-
sions about the framework within which their case-by-case partisan-
ship should go forward.  Appellate courts will rarely consider more 
than one issue of evidence law or criminal procedure at a time.  Pro-
 15 Herbert L. Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. PENN. L. REV. 1, 13–
15 (1964). 
 16 See, e.g., GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA 
BARGAINING IN AMERICA (2003). 
 17 Of course, these institutions may be understood as objects of social-scientific 
inquiry that may employ at least a methodologically driven determinism, but that 
does not imply the absence of real political freedom in those forums. 
 18 See, e.g., WILLIAM T. PIZZI, TRIALS WITHOUT TRUTH: WHY OUR SYSTEM OF 
CRIMINAL TRIALS HAS BECOME AN EXPENSIVE FAILURE AND WHAT WE NEED TO DO TO 
REBUILD IT (1999); see also MARVIN FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTICE (1978) (criticizing the 
absolute formal protections on the defendant’s privilege against self-incrimination at 
trial and the bureaucratic erosion of the privilege through police practices). 
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fessor Findley’s Article raises this question: assuming that the balance 
among formal and informal practices has become skewed and that 
appellate courts are not well placed to reset that balance, how and 
where could real deliberation, not merely partisan wrangling, about 
reforms take place? 
Professor Swift’s Article justly criticizes federal courts’ accretions 
to the hearsay rule and is generally sympathetic to my skepticism that 
exclusionary rules foster accuracy at trial.19  She does, however, ex-
press a concern about “information overload” if the jury trial moves 
in the direction of a free proof regime.20  I, however, believe that this 
concern is best addressed by “macromanaging,” not “micro-
managing,” the trial.  The adversary system itself provides strong in-
centives to partisan lawyers to present evidence that has probative 
value.  The critical devices of the trial provide methods far more 
powerful and flexible for undermining the claimed probative value of 
any tendered evidence.  The necessary concessions to the shortness of 
life that must be made in the trial are, it seems to me, better made by 
time limitations imposed on parties who still maintain a large meas-
ure of control over the details of the evidence they choose to present.  
As Professor Swift notes, I would maintain “some concept of material-
ity”21 as a concession to the law of rules22 at trial.  But there are two 
reasons why materiality should be applied quite liberally.  The first is 
the constitutional status of the jury trial as a device for quite self-
consciously drawing into the legal system perspectives discontinuous 
with those dominant among judges.23  The second is the price that is 
paid in the intelligibility—and so truth—of determinations of inevi-
tably narrative accounts of human actions at trial by the mechanical 
application of inevitably over-generalized exclusionary rules. 
One partial exception to all of this is scientific evidence, the fo-
cus of Professors Christopher Slobogin24 and Edward J. Imwinkel-
ried25 and, to some extent, Professor Findley as well.  Our present 
 19 Swift, supra note 8. 
 20 Id. at 1006. 
 21 Id. at 1004 (quoting Robert P. Burns, Fallacies on Fallacies: A Reply, 2 INT’L 
COMMENT. EVID. (2006)). 
 22 Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 
(1989). 
 23 See, e.g., AMAR, supra note 4; Charles Wolfram, The Constitutional History of the 
Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN. L. REV. 639 (1973). 
 24 Christopher Slobogin, Experts, Mental States, and Acts, 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 
1009 (2008). 
 25 Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Case Against Abandoning the Search for Substantive 
Accuracy, 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 1031 (2008). 
BURNS (FINAL) 12/1/2008  11:44:06 AM 
2008] REMAINING ISSUES IN EVIDENCE LAW 1441 
situation is simply chaotic, with generalist judges making virtually un-
reviewable “discretionary” determinations by consulting a list of over 
a dozen unsystematized “factors,” many of which do not apply at all to 
some forms of expert testimony.  What order can be found in this 
chaos seems based more on routine and outcome rather than the 
quality of the evidence.  As these scholars demonstrate, evaluating at 
least some expert evidence is indeed one of those areas where the de-
vices of the trial are often unable to overcome the bureaucratic and 
market constraints that surround it. And so the concrete suggestions 
they make for improving the quality of scientific evidence, especially 
forensic evidence, should be aggressively explored.  It seems to me 
our current lot would be improved by either higher levels of central-
ized quality control or less authority on the part of trial judges to ad-
mit forms of forensic evidence while excluding more reliable forms of 
social scientific evidence.  The latter may be a second-best practicality 
possible until the former is actually achieved. 
I want to end by congratulating Professor Risinger for bringing 
together scholars who have given us Articles of the highest quality 
that embody the continued revitalization of evidence scholarship and 
that identify important goals of practical reform.  Now, if we can just 
figure out how to get there from here. 
